Iran’s negotiating strategy appears designed not to resolve tensions quickly, but to prolong them—according to reporting that links Tehran’s timetable for talks on its nuclear programme to US domestic politics. The aim, in this view, is to keep Donald Trump “entangled” in the Iran conflict through the US midterm elections, potentially setting up the kind of political blow that former President Jimmy Carter faced over the 1979–81 embassy hostage crisis.
At the centre of the strategy is a shift toward delay. Iranian officials have pointed to a long runway for moving from early contacts to a second stage of negotiations. The deputy foreign minister, Kazem Gharibabadi, told the state news agency IRNA that after Iran agreed a route for commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, it would take between two and four months to reach the next phase of negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme. That framing marks a clear departure from an earlier plan that had envisioned initiating the nuclear talks within 30 days of signing a June memorandum of understanding with the United States.
Commentators and officials quoted in the reporting suggest the timing is not incidental. By dragging out talks, Tehran is seeking political damage to the US president, while some analysts fear the outcome may be less an improvement for Iran than a longer-lived confrontation. In other words, a “bruised and weakened” Trump—if the approach succeeds in reshaping US public perceptions—could still end up presiding over further continuation of conflict rather than de-escalation.
Even as Iran maintains that some form of diplomacy is underway, the substance of negotiations appears carefully compartmentalised. Other reporting indicates that Iran is engaged in parallel arrangements, including discussions with Oman over the management of the strategic Strait of Hormuz. In that account, Iran’s foreign ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baqaei said there were currently no negotiations with the United States, while talks continued with Oman regarding arrangements to secure passage through the strait. The same reporting described discussions over the creation of a route through Hormuz—intended to facilitate commercial shipping after disruptions—without implying that Tehran and Washington have reopened full-spectrum talks.
Iran’s emphasis on the Hormuz file underscores why timing matters. The strait is a chokepoint for global energy shipments, and one of the reporting sources notes that about 20% of the world’s oil normally flows through the area. That makes any operational agreement there not merely symbolic, but economically and strategically consequential—creating strong incentives for rapid resolution, even as Iran appears to be managing expectations and sequencing.
In earlier discussions captured in the reporting, Iran rejected the idea of an even division of traffic between multiple routes and also dismissed proposals that a third country could take responsibility for de-mining. Instead, Iranian officials described their approach as requiring specific routing and security arrangements, with an “intermediate” path potentially used temporarily while broader arrangements are settled. These details indicate that the Hormuz discussions are being treated as a distinct track with its own conditions and constraints.
Tehran’s stance also includes explicit conditions tied to the status of a ceasefire. Reporting from Gulf News states that reopening Hormuz depends on Washington compensating Iran for what Tehran characterises as US violations of the Islamabad Memorandum—a ceasefire agreement signed in June. Iranian foreign minister Abbas Araghchi said Tehran and Muscat were “very close” to agreement and that militaries were discussing details of a temporary shipping route, but he linked reopening to additional requirements. In the same coverage, the White House did not immediately respond to the demands.
That linkage helps explain why the Oman arrangement may not function as a stand-alone breakthrough. Even if commercial traffic can resume under an intermediate plan, Iran appears to be reserving leverage—insisting that meaningful steps require compliance issues on the wider US–Iran dossier. The reporting further notes that the Oman track followed an effective closure of Hormuz in retaliation for US and Israeli attacks in February, implying that the political background to the strait talks remains unsettled.
For Washington, the challenge is compounded by Iran’s insistence on controlling the pace of progress. The Guardian reporting described a timetable in which, after agreement on shipping routing, a second stage of nuclear negotiations would arrive only after months—rather than within the earlier 30-day window associated with the June memorandum. In the same account, the midterms factor is framed as a driving incentive: Tehran’s goal is to keep Trump politically stuck in the Iran file rather than moving cleanly toward an outcome.
This approach aligns with the wider pattern described across the reporting: where diplomacy exists, it is often bounded. Iran’s diplomatic messaging separates operational shipping matters—handled with Oman—from direct negotiations with the United States, which Iran’s foreign ministry spokesman said were not happening at the moment. The sequencing suggests that Tehran intends to keep US attention on crisis management and strategic chokepoints while limiting the likelihood of a rapid nuclear breakthrough.
The political arithmetic, as reported, is that sustained friction can become a campaign liability for US leaders. By timing the negotiation process to US electoral milestones, Tehran may be seeking to shape domestic debate, constrain Trump’s ability to claim progress, and increase the costs—human, financial, and strategic—of any escalation or reversal.
Still, the same reporting acknowledges a counter-risk: if the process succeeds in damaging Trump politically, it may also entrench the conflict rather than ending it. With a longer negotiation runway, the possibility grows that events will outpace diplomacy—either through miscalculation in the Hormuz zone, through tit-for-tat actions, or through a broader regional security environment that remains tense.
As Iran maintains that talks with Oman continue while it says Washington negotiations are paused, the immediate question becomes what, if anything, can be achieved on timelines that satisfy both sides. For now, Iran’s public conditions on reopening the strait and its internal timetable for nuclear phases suggest that any de-escalatory gains may be partial and delayed—precisely the kind of uncertainty that could keep the conflict prominent in the run-up to US midterm voting.
Whether Tehran’s strategy becomes a decisive political blow or instead a mechanism for prolonging instability will likely hinge on Washington’s response to Iran’s conditions and on whether any bridging steps emerge between the shipping track and the nuclear track. For the moment, Iran’s message—about sequencing, leverage, and the timetable for next phases—points toward a deliberate effort to hold negotiations in the spotlight without allowing them to conclude quickly.
Sources: The Guardian; France 24; Gulf News; The Guardian.
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